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What does democracy require for political parties and a party 
system?
Parties (and now other forms of ‘election fighting organisation’, like referendum 
campaigns) are diverse, so four kinds of democratic evaluation criteria are needed:
(i) Structuring competition and engagement
✦	 The party system should provide citizens with a framework for simplifying and 
organising political ideas and discourses, providing coherent packages of policy 
proposals, so as to sustain vigorous and effective electoral competition between 
rival teams.
✦	 Parties should provide enduring brands, able to sustain the engagement and trust of 
most citizens over long periods. Because they endure through time, parties should 
behave responsibly, knowing that citizens can hold them effectively to account in 
future.
✦	 Main parties should help to recruit, socialise, select and promote talented individuals 
into elected public office, ranging from local council to national government levels.
✦	 Party groups inside elected legislatures (such as MPs or councillors), and elites and 
members in the party’s extra-parliamentary organisation, should help to sustain 
viable and accountable leadership teams. They should also be important channels 
for the scrutiny of public policies and the elected leadership’s conduct in office and 
behaviour in the public interest.
The political parties and party system
Patrick Dunleavy and Sean Kippin examine how democratic the UK’s party system and 
political parties are. Parties often attract criticism from those outside their ranks, but they 
have multiple, complex roles to play in any liberal democratic society. The UK’s system has 
many strengths, but also key weaknesses, where meaningful reform could realistically take 
place.
3.1
94 3. How democratic are the channels for political participation?
(ii) Representing civil society
✦	 The party system should be reasonably inclusive, covering a broad range of 
interests and views in civil society. Parties should not exclude or discriminate against 
people on the basis of gender, ethnicity or other characteristics.
✦	 Citizens should be able to form and grow new political parties easily, without 
encountering onerous or artificial official barriers privileging existing, established or 
incumbent parties.
✦	 Party activities should be regulated independently by impartial officials and 
agencies, so as to prevent self-serving protection of existing incumbents.
(iii) Internal party democracy and transparency
✦	 Long-established parties inevitably accumulate discretionary political power in the 
exercise of their functions. This creates some citizen dependencies upon them and 
always has ‘oligopolistic’ effects in restricting political competition (for example, 
concentrating funding and advertising/campaign capabilities in main parties). To 
compensate, the internal leadership of parties and their processes for setting policies 
should be responsive to a wide membership, one that is open and easy to join.
✦	 Leadership selection and the setting of main policies should operate democratically 
and transparently to members and other groupings inside the party (such as party 
MPs or members of legislatures). Independent regulation should ensure that parties 
stick both to their rule books and to public interest practices.
 (iv) Political finance
✦	 Parties should be able to raise substantial political funding of their own, but subject 
to independent regulation to ensure that effective electoral competition is not 
undermined by inequities of funding.
✦	 Individuals, organisations or interests providing large donations to parties or other 
‘election fighting organisations’ (such as referendum campaigns) must not gain 
enhanced or differential influence over public policies, or the allocation of social 
prestige (such as honours). 
✦	 All donations must be fully transparent, and without payments from ‘front’ 
organisations or foreign sources. The size of individual contributions should be 
capped where they raise doubts of undue influence.
Recent developments: the party system 
Political parties in the UK are normally stable organisations. Their vote shares and party 
membership levels typically alter only moderately from one period to the next. But since 
2014, party fortunes have changed radically in the UK, particularly in England and Scotland. 
In 2017 the top two parties secured more than four-fifths of votes in the UK (Figure 2), 
whereas in England (their ‘home ground’) their share was 73% only two years earlier (Figure 
1). With the Brexit referendum won for ‘Leave’ in 2016 and its party leadership in chaos 
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without its former leader Nigel Farage, the UK Independence Party’s (UKIP’s) support in 
England in 2017 plummeted to 2% – whereas two years earlier they commanded one in 
seven English votes at the general election (and their opinion poll ratings were higher). 
Already in 2015, the Liberal Democrats’ vote share had fallen sharply to just 8% in England 
(and lower elsewhere), around a third of its 2010 level – as the electors punished them 
for their 2010–15 ‘austerity’ coalition government with the Tories. In 2017 their support still 
languished, although in local council elections in 2017 and 2018 they secured around one 
in six votes. 
Yet the most fundamental difference in the UK party systems between the elections arose 
from the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Figure 1 below shows that in 2015 the competition 
space of British politics was still essentially one-dimensional – so that parties could still be 
organised on a classical left-right dimension, with the left standing for more public-sector 
spending and egalitarian policies, and the right standing for free-market solutions, less 
welfare spending and stronger policies on restricting immigration. There was a pro- and 
anti-European Union dimension in British politics in 2015 but only UKIP, with their advocacy 
of EU withdrawal, placed it centre stage. For the rest the issue was sublimated, with the 
Cameron-led Conservatives and Miliband-led Labour both offering very similar and quite 
consensual-seeming ‘European’ policy positions. Inside the Tories, although strong currents 
of Euroscepticism were beginning to predominate again behind the scenes, this issue 
hardly featured in Cameron’s 2015 campaign. 
Figure 1: The party system in England, in the May 2015 general election
Source: P. Dunleavy, 2017 Lecture.
Notes: The positions of party ‘circles’ show their approximate left/right position; the size of the circles 
shows indicates their vote shares in England. Parties with names underlined won seats.
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By 2017, Figure 2 shows that a year after the shock June 2016 referendum vote for ‘Leave’ 
the space of party competition was clearly two-dimensional, with the left-right ideological 
spectrum now cross-cut slantwise by a three-fold cleavage between:
✦	 Strong Eurosceptics committed to implementing the ‘Leave’ vote, whatever the 
consequences, perhaps even walking away from the EU with a ‘no deal’ outcome – 
shown in the purple-shaded area.
Figure 2: The UK’s changed party system at the 2017 general election and the subsequent 
Brexit negotiations phase
Source: P. Dunleavy, 2017 Lecture. 
Notes: The positions of party circles show their approximate left/right position; the size shows their 
vote shares at the 2017 general election. The dotted line around the Liberal Democrats indicates their 
approximate level of support in 2017 and 2018 local elections (16%, calculated using the BBC’s national 
equivalent votes share measure).
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✦	 Strong ‘Remainers’ committed to retaining the closest possible relationship with or full 
customs union and single market access to the EU, and perhaps to holding a second 
referendum for the public to approve the detailed outcome of withdrawal negotiations 
– shown in the green shaded area. Significant sections of public and elite opinion here 
were also willing to see the 2016 vote reversed if possible.
✦	 In between, in the unshaded area, lie the largest blocs of elite and public opinion, 
committed to implementing the ‘Leave’ vote so that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ as May 
insisted, but also seeking the best possible compromise outcome for the UK in retaining 
links to the EU while yet not having to accept ‘freedom of movement’ of EU citizens into 
the UK, or any EU policies, or jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice.
These pro- and anti-Brexit lines of cleavage affect both the main parties. There are more 
Conservative ultra-Leavers and more Labour strong Remainers, but both the top two 
parties are internally divided into the three groups above. Only the Liberal Democrats, 
Scottish National Party (SNP), and the Greens came out fully for remaining in the EU or as 
close as possible, while the now-diminished UKIP was equally clearly for leaving ‘come 
what may’. The divisions within the main parties meant that although Theresa May called 
the snap 2017 election supposedly to strengthen her bargaining hand in negotiations with 
Brussels, in fact the EU withdrawal issue was again handled in a ‘sub voce’ manner by both 
Conservatives and especially Labour – whose policy position concentrated on domestic 
issues and remained deliberately very vague on European issues.
A succession of parliamentary votes on Brexit legislation in 2017 and 2018 has so far only 
confirmed the picture in Figure 2, with Labour’s position varying quite markedly depending 
on the detailed wording of each vote. Significant numbers of Conservatives have voted 
against the May government’s ‘shaky compromise’ strategies at various stages, while many 
Labour MPs in strong Leave-voting constituencies have supported the government against 
their party line on occasion (while others, particularly London MPs, have rebelled for pro-EU 
amendments). Jeremy Corbyn has especially kept Labour’s policy line so subtly modulated 
as to be almost invisible outside Parliament itself.
So British party politics has never in recent history been so complex, and party labels 
have rarely been so little use in predicting how people stand on the dominant issue facing 
the UK. At the same time the successive ‘suicide’ decisions of the Liberal Democrats (in 
2010–15, by backing the Cameron-Clegg coalition government and implementing austerity 
policies for five years) and of UKIP (by losing Nigel Farage as leader at the height of the 
party’s Brexit success, and being unable to replace him in any coherent way) have boosted 
the Conservative–Labour dominance of the political process. The apparent two-party 
predominance broadly endured in opinion polls into mid-2018 raising questions about 
whether the UK (or at least England) has decisively shifted back in love with ‘two-party’ 
competition? Or will multi-partism survive (as it clearly has at local level) and grow back 
once the stress of Brexit decisions eases?
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Recent developments: inside the parties
Labour: In the extended 2017 election campaign Jeremy Corbyn reversed a 20 percentage 
point deficit in the opinion polls at the outset, thanks to a growth in younger supporters 
and sophisticated online campaigning. Aided by May’s campaign misfiring, his leadership 
produced an unprecedented 10 percentage point growth in Labour’s vote share over six 
weeks. 
This performance cemented Corbyn’s leadership and the policy changes that he had 
implemented, shifting the Labour Party decisively leftwards in opposition to austerity 
cuts; and contemplating re-extending public ownership again for the railways, water and 
perhaps other industries. He maintained support for implementing the 2016 Brexit vote, 
while successfully masking or finessing this stance with pro-Remain supporters (not least 
amongst the young). His triumph came after two torpid years. In summer 2015 Corbyn was 
only just allowed to stand for the leadership at all by the naïve generosity of some centrist 
MPs in getting him 15% of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) signatures. His runaway 
victory, with over three-fifths support amongst the party’s newly enlarged membership, was 
greeted with horror by the PLP’s centre-right, but showed how astonishingly out of touch 
most Labour MPs had got from their activists. In summer 2016 Corbyn’s perceived failure to 
campaign overtly enough for Remain was the trigger for four-fifths of his Shadow Cabinet 
to resign, triggering another leadership election. Yet the attempted coup was almost 
farcically mis-handled. No viable alternative candidate had been identified in advance, and 
an attempt to make Corbyn re-gather nominations from 15% of MPs before he could stand 
again also failed. He subsequently romped home with 62% support from members, against 
a lacklustre and previously unknown centrist candidate, Owen Smith. 
At long last the PLP had to accept his leadership, and Corbyn and his MPs held their nerve 
when May called a snap election. They gave her the two-thirds consent of the Commons 
that she needed under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, despite Labour lagging badly in the 
polls. The process for defining a Labour manifesto then worked well, producing a popular 
document with few hostages to fortune. And in the aftermath of the narrow 2017 defeat, 
Corbyn steered a rule change through the party’s National Executive lowering the PLP 
nominations bar to 10% of MPs, so ensuring that a future left candidacy for the leadership 
should be feasible. Most of the new MPs in 2017 are Corbynites, the Shadow Cabinet 
has worked well (despite Labour’s evasiveness on Brexit), and Labour’s poll ratings have 
broadly tied with the government’s into summer 2018. The alleged influence of Momentum, 
a parallel movement of Labour supporters, has not so far produced clear evidence of far-
left ‘entryism’, and threats to sitting MPs from the left have been relatively few.
On another front Corbyn has faced strong and vocal criticism by UK Jewish organisations 
that Labour has failed to crack down on anti-semitism within its ranks. An official Labour 
report found that the problem was small scale. And the NEC subsequently took actions 
to strengthen disciplinary penalties for members breaching the party’s code of conduct 
– whose most prominent casualty included former London mayor Ken Livingstone, who 
resigned from the party in spring 2018 over the issue. The party’s vulnerability to attack 
here reflects three factors: the re-growth of the Labour left (who condemn the illegal 
permanent Israeli occupation of territories seized after the 1967 war); Corbyn’s identification 
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with this position, and Labour’s remodelling itself as a multi-ethnic urban party. The PLP 
has demanded a stronger definition of anti-semitism in the code of conduct – eventually 
enacted (see Chapter 7.3). However, the party’s defenders argue that the pro-Israel lobby 
in the UK systematically categorises every criticism of that state as anti-semitism – in order 
to close down criticism of Israeli repressive actions against Palestinians. 
Conservatives: The party under Theresa May also increased their 2017 vote share, reaping 
a dividend from UKIP’s collapse. Yet this was not enough to retain a Commons majority 
against the Labour surge, nor to save May’s legitimacy with her party for ‘wasting’ David 
Cameron’s (small) 2015 majority. May became a party leader and Prime Minister on notice, 
with an expectation that at some point she would be superseded, either by resigning or by 
a leadership contest being triggered. Her original accession in 2016 (with only an aborted 
election, from which all other candidate fell away) turned into a liability when May proved 
an uncharismatic (allegedly ‘robotic’) performer on the campaign trail. And her two top 
aides were widely blamed for mishandling a 2017 manifesto pledge on taxing the elderly to 
fund social care, resulting in the advisors’ subsequent speedy departure. 
May also faced a difficult task of party management over its Brexit strategy, which 
constantly plagued her during her first two years in office. She ensured that Brexiteers 
formed a third of her Cabinet, gave them some key negotiating roles (notably David 
Davis, supposedly in charge of negotiations) and brought her main erstwhile rival for the 
leadership, Boris Johnson, into the Cabinet in the (deliberately?) inappropriate role of 
Foreign Secretary. In July 2018, she forced a long-delayed confrontation over the UK’s 
Brexit negotiating position with the Brexiteers in the Cabinet at a Chequers awayday, 
only to see Johnson and Davis both resign two days later and a guerrilla war escalate in 
Parliament with her large group of Brexiteer MPs.
The Conservative’s key problem is that both wings of the party have suffered cataclysmic 
defeats in intra-party battles in living memory, which were so fundamental for both sides 
that maintaining the Tories’ famous capacity to coalesce under pressure has become 
very difficult. For the right, the 1990 ejection of Margaret Thatcher from the leadership 
by the pro-European centre-left created a ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth that fuelled a bitter 
Euroscepticism that grew and became more intense over nearly three decades. For the 
centre-left, the Brexit Leave vote became a symmetrical disaster, causing the consequent 
ejection of David Cameron (and his Chancellor/heir apparent George Osborne) from 
Downing Street. The Tory right’s role here was one Remainers find equally hard to forgive – 
reversing as it does 43 years of centre-left policies on the EU.
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Britain’s party system is stable, and the 
main parties generally provide coherent 
platforms consistent with their ‘brand’ 
and ‘image’, despite the party cleavages 
caused by the Brexit issue (see above).
Party membership in the UK has increased from 
a low base in 2010, but it is still low. Around 
950,000 people are party members, out of 
a population of 65.6 million, with Labour and 
the SNP both showing strong recent growth. 
Conservative membership is now perhaps the 
most elderly of all the parties and remains small 
relative to Labour’s renewed mass membership.
Britain’s political parties continue to 
attract competent and talented individuals 
to run for office.
Plurality rule elections (see Chapter 2.1) 
privilege established major parties with strong 
‘safe seat’ bastions of support, at the expense 
of new entrants. The most active political 
competition thus tends to be focused on a 
minority of around 120 marginal seats, with 
policies tailored to appeal to the voters therein.
Entry conditions vary somewhat by party, 
but it is not difficult or arduous to join and 
influence the UK’s political parties. Labour 
initially opened up the choice of their 
top two leadership positions to a wider 
electorate using their existing trade union 
networks and a £3 ‘supporter’ scheme (in 
2015), but later reverted to full members 
only voting, after tensions with the party’s 
MPs. 
It is fairly simple to form new political parties 
in the UK, but funding nomination fees for 
Westminster elections is still costly. And in 
plurality rule elections new parties with millions 
of votes may still win no seats, as happened 
to UKIP in 2015. At local level, some one-party 
dominant areas also produce councils with no 
opposition councillors at all.
All the main parties (except perhaps UKIP) 
have recruited across ethnic boundaries, 
helping to foster the integration of black 
and ethnic minority groups into the 
mainstream of UK politics.
Labour has had long-running difficulties with 
allegations of anti-semitism amongst some party 
members in recent years (see above). Some 
critics argue that the Conservatives have failed 
to tackle Islamophobia within their ranks.
Labour has involved a wider set of 
‘supporters’ in its affairs and used digital 
campaigning more. And the separate 
group Momentum has helped channel 
back disillusioned, left-leaning people 
who had left the party under Blair and 
Brown, and younger people into ‘parallel’ 
Labour involvements through both 
‘clicktivist’ and more ‘old school’ activism.
Most mechanisms of internal democracy 
have accorded little influence to their party 
memberships beyond choosing the winner in 
leadership elections. Jeremy Corbyn claims to 
be counteracting this and listening more to his 
members. However, in consequence, Labour 
struggled to delineate the relationship between 
MPs in the parliamentary party and the enlarged 
membership (who may not reflect Labour voters’ 
views well). 
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The UK’s main political parties are not over-
reliant on state subsidies and can generally 
finance themselves either through private 
membership fees, individual donation and 
corporate donations, or (in Labour’s case) 
trade unions funding.
There are large inequities in political finance 
available to parties, with some key aspects left 
unregulated. These may distort political (if not) 
electoral competition. Majority governments can 
alter party funding rules in directly partisan and 
adversarial ways (see below).
In the restricted areas where it can 
regulate the parties, the Electoral 
Commission is independent from day-to-
day partisan interference.
The ‘professionalisation of politics’ is widely 
seen as having ‘squeezed out’ other people 
with a developed background outside of politics 
(but see below).
Future opportunities Future threats
Before the 2016 Brexit vote the UK 
seemed to be historically evolving 
towards multi-party politics, a trend 
that also found expression in elections 
beyond Westminster and English local 
government. New and ‘outsider’ parties 
strengthened anti-oligopoly tendencies. 
Since then, however, public opinion 
showed a renewed emphasis upon top 
two party competition.
Critics argue that the cross-cutting of both the 
top two parties by Brexit positions shown in 
Figure 2 means that party labels and identities 
are no longer effectively structuring (but instead 
obscuring) the dominant issues in UK politics.
Some strong ‘new party’ trends 
have emerged towards broadening 
involvements using digital means and 
extended outreach/lowered barriers to 
membership within Labour and the SNP. 
These developments could strengthen 
party ties with civil society, reversing years 
of weakening. Alternatively these effects 
may ebb away again (see below).
In multi-party conditions, plurality rule elections 
for Westminster may operate in ever more 
eccentric or dramatic ways, as with the SNP’s 
2015 landslide in Scotland almost obliterating 
all other parties’ MPs there. The SNP’s strong 
support in 2014–16 threatened to create a 
‘dominant party system’ in Scotland, where 
party alternation in government ceases for 
a long period. However, this prospect soon 
receded with both Tory and Labour revivals 
north of the border.
Digital changes also open up new ways in 
which parties can connect to supporters 
beyond their formal memberships and 
increase their links to and engagement 
with a wider range of voters. Parties 
now generally conduct their leadership 
elections using an online system which 
makes it easier to register a preference. 
Other matters of internal party business 
and campaigns could soon be affected, 
potentially including setting policy.
The growth of political populism and identity 
divisions post-EU referendum has ‘hollowed 
out’ the centre ground of British politics, with 
the Liberal Democrats unable to regain their 
earlier momentum.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The advent of far greater ‘citizen vigilance’ 
operating via the web and social media 
like Twitter and Facebook creates a 
new and far more intensive ‘public gaze’ 
scrutinising parties’ internal operations. 
Tools such as ‘voting advice’ application 
apps or the Democratic Dashboard also 
allow voters to access reliable information 
about elections and democracy in 
their area – information that neither 
government nor the top parties has so far 
either been able or willing to provide.
Moves by governing political parties to alter 
laws, rules and regulations so as to skew 
future political competition and disadvantage 
their rivals can set dangerous precedents 
that degrade the quality of democracy. 
The Conservative government’s changes 
to electoral registration and redrawing of 
constituency boundaries may all have such 
effects, even if implemented in non-partisan 
ways.
All the UK’s different legislatures 
(Westminster, and the devolved assemblies/
parliaments in Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland, and London) have now sustained 
coalition governments of different political 
stripes and at different periods, and each 
has operated stably. Therefore, the UK’s 
adversarial political culture does not rule 
out cross-party cooperation where electoral 
outcomes make it necessary.
Changes in the Scottish party system
By contrast to England, and to a large extent Wales also, in Scotland politics has long 
operated across two ideological dimensions, with left/right cleavages cross-cut by another 
issue of equal (sometimes greater) salience: should Scotland stay in the UK, or not? 
And how much power should be devolved to Edinburgh? Following the extraordinary 
mobilisation around the 2014 independence referendum (which was narrowly lost by 55% 
to 45%) this line of cleavage greatly benefited the SNP (and the Scottish Greens in a much 
smaller way). It tended to undermine and push together the other four parties, all of which 
campaigned to keep the union with the UK. 
Despite their ’Indy’ referendum defeat, the SNP’s enhanced membership and morale meant 
that by the time of the 2015 general election they gained a pre-eminence as the ‘voice 
for Scotland’ against the prospect of a clear majority Tory UK government, as shown in 
Figure 3a. Gaining half of all Scottish votes in 2015, they won all but three of the country’s 
59 seats, leaving Labour’s traditional dominance of Scottish representation in the UK 
Parliament shattered with just one MP, the same number gained by the Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats. For a time, it looked as if the SNP would exert a hard-to-challenge 
dominance in Scottish politics, controlling as they did both the Scottish government in 
Edinburgh, a majority of all MSPs and almost all Scottish representation at Westminster, 
against a multiply-divided opposition.
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Figure 3: The Scottish party system at the 2015 and 2017 general elections
Source: Dunleavy, LSE Lecture Notes for course Gv311.
Notes: The size of each party circle indicates its rough size and salience in the party system, and its 
approximate position in two-dimensional space. The numbers in each circle show that party’s vote 
share percentage in Scotland. Parties with names underlined won seats.
In the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, however, the SNP as incumbents lost a little 
ground in votes (down to 42%, and 63 of 129 seats), while the Tories jumped nearly 11% 
to become the main opposition on 23% support, and Labour fell back badly to third. The 
Liberal Democrats were unchanged, but the Greens moved from 2 to 6 seats, becoming 
critical for the SNP staying in power. Nicola Sturgeon looked to have four more years as 
First Minister, and when Scotland voted by 62% to 38% not to leave the European Union, 
her allies quickly raised the prospect of holding a second referendum on independence far 
more speedily than anyone had previously envisaged – not least to resist a Westminster 
‘land grab’ for EU powers that the SNP argued could permanently reset the devolution 
settlement in the UK’s favour.
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By 2017, however, public support for any second independence referendum amongst 
Scottish voters was clearly a minority view. The new Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth 
Davidson, moved her party’s position decisively towards the political centre, endorsed 
more devolution of powers to Scotland, and sharpened criticisms of the SNP’s government 
at Holyrood. The Tories perhaps attracted more support from pro-union Labour and Liberal 
Democrat voters as the most viable unionist opposition. 
In addition, during the June 2017 election campaign Jeremy Corbyn’s UK national 
leadership also shifted Labour’s image leftwards, and brought the party back in line with 
the Scotland’s left-leaning political spectrum. The party also backed more powers for 
Scotland and slightly blurred its rejection of independence (for instance, no longer making 
support for independence inconsistent with Labour membership). These changes caused 
a significant swing back to a multi-party system, shown in Figure 3b above. The later 
easy victory of Corbynite Richard Leonard as Scottish Labour leader consolidated these 
changes, although he has yet make much of a mark with voters at large. 
The SNP could not sustain its 2015 majority vote share, losing a quarter of its support. Its 
seats were slashed back from 56 to 35, just under three-fifths of the total of Scotland’s 59 
MPs. The scale and speed of these seat reversals was damaging. It was not until spring 
2018 that the SNP dared to publicly re-launch the idea of an Indy 2 referendum, at some 
point after Brexit had occurred, perhaps in 2020 or 2021. The danger of Scotland becoming 
a ‘dominant party system’ – where the same party is a serial winner against a fragmented 
opposition incapable of co-operating to defeat it – clearly had receded after 2016. 
Structuring competition and party ‘brands’
We noted above that the main alternative dimension in England has been the pro- and anti-
EU one, increasingly overlapping in UKIP’s campaigning with anti-immigrant sentiments. 
The right-wing press have also explicitly played to anti-immigrant views, notably in their 
Brexit coverage, but officially the Tories have not played along. However, Theresa May’s 
insistence on maintaining the net immigration target of below 100,000 people a year, which 
was set under the Cameron government when she was Home Secretary, and which has 
never been even vaguely approached by actual, much higher migration levels, undoubtedly 
reflects a sub voce Conservative appeal on the same lines. Attitudes towards immigration 
are far more aligned with existing left-right cleavages, especially as Labour has developed 
towards being more of an urban/multicultural party, less dominated by its working class/
trade union lineage.
Both the top two British parties have had chronic difficulties in organising around the EU/
immigration aspect of politics, maintaining an agreed strategy of not vocally campaigning 
on immigration, lest it stir up ethnic tensions. As we saw above, Labour has become 
progressively more pro-EU since Brexit (echoing more the strongly European stances under 
previous leaders) and the Conservative MPs (if not their leadership) have become more 
anti-EU and pro-Brexit. 
The enduring quality of parties’ appeals is borne out by recent research showing that 
strong party supporters place themselves ideologically at the same place as the parties 
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they identify with. Supporters tend to accurately perceive their own party’s position, but 
to see opposing parties as more ‘extreme’ than they are. On the centre-left in 2017 there 
were multiple overlaps of party supporters’ views amongst Labour, the Greens and Liberal 
Democrats, while on the right the Conservatives and UKIP overlapped in some anti-EU 
positions. Yet in mid-terms, between general elections, around two-fifths of those backing 
major parties told IPSOS-MORI they did not know what they stood for. 
So are main parties failing to communicate their brands in a sustained and consistent 
manner? A potential explanation may lie with the various processes of party ‘modernisation’ 
that took place over recent years, with each of the three main parties attempting to ‘move 
to the centre’. The shifts to a more ‘managerialist’ politics of detail that occurred before 
Corbyn, the EU referendum and May’s realignment of the Tories may have left many voters 
less clear what each party advocates. But the reconfiguration of British party politics since 
2016 now suggests that a realignment of the party system may be in train, with UKIP 
potentially eliminated altogether, to the Tories’ great benefit.
Electing party leaders, or not
For a brief period in the 2010s, all the parties enacted protracted processes in which their 
mass memberships would elect the party leaders, albeit from fields of contenders that were 
initially defined by MPs. Yet some of these arrangements now look as if they are likely to 
change or fall into abeyance. Jeremy Corbyn’s two commanding party leadership election 
wins in 2015 and 2016 set him up to almost succeed as a campaigner in the 2017 general 
election, and the changes lowering the share of MPs needed for nomination (noted above) 
may guarantee that Labour’s internal elections remain critical for the party in future. 
However, in the other two leading parties, the members’ voice has recently been de-
activated and leadership competition denied. In June 2016, following Cameron’s shock 
resignation, complex politicking amongst Tory MPs meant that Boris Johnson did not 
even make the nomination stage and Michael Gove was ignominiously eliminated at the 
‘winnowing out’ second ballot of Tory MPs. The clear frontrunner Theresa May was left 
facing only the relatively unknown Brexiteer Andrea Leadsom in a run-off vote by party 
members that would in theory take all summer long. Leadsom withdrew, making May the 
unelected but initially unquestioned leader. Effectively the Tory MPs’ fix denied their party 
members any chance to vote.
However, May’s subsequent huge problems as party leader, and her lack of success 
as a campaigner at the 2017 general election, may mean that the next Tory leadership 
contest will have to run by the book and involve members after all. The complex politics of 
precipitating a new contest without seeming to be ‘disloyal’ put many alternative leaders off 
in 2017–18, especially while May could be left to bear the burden of the Brexit negotiations. 
But as time wears on, the pressure for a resolution of her perceived ‘caretaker only’ 
leadership tenure will intensify. 
The second party where members effectively lost a vote was the Liberal Democrats. When 
they came to elect a new leader after their 2015 general election losses their party had 
only eight MPs left in the Commons to choose from. Tim Farron took the helm in 2015 but 
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made little impact. In 2017 he stood down and the elderly returning MP Vince Cable was 
the only candidate to replace him. By mid-2018 he had largely failed to improve the party’s 
lowly opinion poll ratings, perhaps reflecting Cable’s own close involvement in the 2010–15 
coalition government. The party’s deputy leader, Jo Swinson, may be the party’s best hope 
of remaking its image in time for a 2022 general election, by passing the leadership baton 
to a new gender and generation.
Internal democracy for policy-making
All the parties have moved to greater transparency and openness in their affairs, and have 
different arrangements for intra-party democracy to periodically set aspects of party policy. 
Labour’s widening of membership and election of the party’s National Executive Committee 
by members is the most radical innovation, and has created a left majority under Corbyn.
The remaining parties still operate more orthodox arrangements. In theory, Liberal 
Democrats have the most internally democratic party, with the federal party and party 
conference enjoying a pre-eminent role in policy formation. Yet in the coalition period 
the exigencies of the party being in government seemed to easily negate this nominal 
influence (as has long been argued to be the case in the top two parties). Conservative 
Party members have relatively little formal influence over party policy, with key decisions 
made largely in Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet, and to a lesser degree by the national party 
machine. At local level, members have more influence, but they rarely challenge sitting 
MPs. UKIP’s members are not empowered by their party’s constitution, which declares that 
motions at conference will only be considered as ‘advisory’, rather than binding. The Green 
Party probably allows its membership the greatest degree of influence over internal policy, 
but in local government has had to tighten up in the few areas where it has exercised 
power (such as in Brighton).
Recruiting political elites
The main political parties regularly sustain a steady stream of individuals to run for political 
office, who can be socialised, selected and promoted into their structures. However, the 
impression has gained ground that increasingly only candidates with professional, back-
office backgrounds are being chosen. In fact, such ‘politics professionals’ make up less 
than one in six MPs, far lower than popular accounts envisage. However, it is true that: 
‘MPs who worked full-time in politics before being elected dominate the top frontbench 
positions, whilst colleagues whose political experience consisted of being a local councillor 
tended to remain backbenchers’. So politics professionals within the top parties do tend to 
dominate media and policy debates.
In terms of wider social diversity, the 2017 parliament is in some ways (notably gender and 
ethnicity) the most diverse and representative ever. Yet as Hudson and Campbell noted 
in 2015 (when the same claim was made): ‘To put the progress made in perspective, the 
UK would need to elect 130 more women and double the current number of black and 
ethnic minority MPs to make its parliament descriptively representative of the population 
it serves.’ Just 2% more MPs were women in 2017. The problem is that research continues 
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to show that all the main parties’ membership is disproportionally white, male, middle aged 
and middle class, with the problem being most severe for the Conservatives. Against this 
background achieving sustained and rapid improvements in the recruitment of diverse 
prospective candidates is tricky.
Representing civil society
The standard theme of now dated textbook discussions is that the major political parties 
are declining in their ability to recruit members, and thereby becoming ‘cartel parties’ 
dependent for their lifeblood upon large donors (such as very rich individuals for all parties, 
or trade unions with large membership blocs for Labour), or upon state subsidies to parties. 
Yet Figure 4 shows that this narrative of continuous decline has not been accurate for 
British parties as a whole in the 21st century.
Figure 4: The membership levels of UK political parties, 2002–18
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and, in the case of the Conservatives, media estimates. Where available, 
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Note: Labour party membership figures for 2015 and 2016 include party members and 
affiliated supporters, but exclude registered supporters.  
Sources: Prior to 2016 (All parties excluding Con) figures derived from party annual accounts 
submitted to the Electoral Commission year ending 31 December; 2016 figures, for all parties 
except Conservative, are based on information provided by Parties’ head offices and recent 
estimates in news articles as of 2018; Conservative membership figures derive from 2002-2006 
Daily Telegraph; 2008 News of the World estimate; 2010 -2011 estimates reported by the 
Independent and Daily Mail 2013- 2014; May Bulman, Labour - James Tapsfield, Has Corbyn 
peaked? Labour membership falls by more than 4,200 in a WEEK - but still stands at 552,000, 
Daily Mail, 30 January 2018. 
2. PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY PARTY 2002-2018
Thousands (as at December each year, latest data: August 2017 and March-April 2018) 
 
Source: Lukas Audickas, Noel Dempsey, Richard Keen, Membership of Political Parties, House of 
Co mons Library Briefing Paper SN05 25, 1 May 18, p.8 
Notes: The vertical xis here shows thousands of members, from annual accounts submitted to the 
electoral commission, data from parties’ head offices and, in the case of the Conservatives, media 
estimates. The Labour Party membership numbers of 2015 and 2016 include full party members and 
affiliated supporters, but not ‘registered supporters’ (who paid only £3). Dotted lines show estimates 
based on media reports.
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The last four years in Figure 4 show soaring numbers of members for the SNP since the 
independence referendum and of the Labour Party since easier membership rules, low 
cost fees, and the post-general election changes. Some observers point out that now with 
522,000 individual members, a Corbyn-led Labour has gained perhaps £8m in annual 
fees and so may be able to reduce its dependence on affiliated trade unions’ block fee 
payments – a goal that eluded all previous Labour leaders. The Conservatives also moved 
against the unions again. The Trade Union Act 2016 introduced an ‘opt-in’ requirement for 
political levies for new members of trade unions, replacing the previous opt-out provision. 
This may (gradually) hit Labour’s union income in future years, or it may be mitigated by 
improvements in union communication practices. 
All these changes mean that parties now draw very different proportions of their income 
from membership subscriptions. Figure 5 shows that the Greens and SNP are the parties 
for whom membership fees count most as a source of income, with the Conservatives 
bottom, and the Liberal Democrats next. Labour, Plaid Cymru and UKIP are in the 
intermediate group.
Figure 5: Income from membership revenues as a percentage of total income
Source: Party annual accounts submitted to the Electoral Commission
In some European countries, a recent rejuvenation of party politics has taken two 
contrasting forms. Some new left parties committed to a different kind of ‘close to civil 
society’ politics emerged on the left (like Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece). More 
often though populist, anti-EU/anti-immigration parties grew markedly on the radical right. 
Some observers even discern the ‘death of representative politics’ in such changes. But 
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in the UK the highly insulating plurality rule voting system (see Chapter 2.1) at Westminster 
has asymmetrically protected the top two UK parties, with the UKIP wave artificially 
excluded from Parliament on the right in 2015. And left-of-centre movements have 
happened not in new parties but within the ranks of Labour (in England) and the SNP (in 
Scotland). These latter changes have proved resilient so far, but they may still not endure if 
either party experiences setbacks in future.
Political finance
The core foundations of the UK’s party funding system lie in electoral law. Two key 
provisions are: (i) the imposition of very restrictive local campaign finance limits on parties 
and candidates; and (ii) the outlawing of any paid-for broadcast advertising by parties in 
favour of state-funded and strictly regulated party election broadcasts (set by votes won 
last time). Opposition parties also have the benefit of a degree of state funding (called 
‘Short money’ and again related to votes received) but this is only available to those parties 
with at least one MP (see Chapter 4.1). The bulk of the funds so far has gone to fund the 
leaders’ offices of Labour, the SNP and Liberal Democrats.
Political finance nonetheless still matters immensely in UK politics because two types of 
spending are completely uncontrolled, namely: (iii) supra-local campaigning and advertising 
in the press, billboards, social media and other generic formats; and (iv) general campaign 
and organisational spending by parties, which is crucial to parties’ abilities to set agendas 
and create media coverage ‘opportunities’, especially outside the narrowly defined and 
more media-regulated election periods themselves. 
Figure 5: Donations to political parties, 2013–17
Party £ millions % of all 
donations2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
2013–17
Conservatives 15.9 29.2 33.2 17.5 37.1 132.9 50.5
Labour 13.3 18.7 21.5 13.9 16.1 83.5 32
Lib Dems 3.9 8.3 6.7 6.4 6.30 31.6 12
UKIP 0.67 1.2 3.3 1.6 0.65 7.4 2.8
SNP 0.04 3.8 1.2 0.14 0.87 6.5 2.5
Green 0.19 0.66 0.43 0.18 0.28 1.8 0.7
Total 34 62 66 40 61.3 263.3 100
Source: Electoral Commission
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
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In terms of private donations Figure 5 shows that the Conservative Party gained just 
over half of the total across the 2013–17 period, mostly from very rich people. Labour, 
meanwhile, received a smaller 32%, partly from mass membership and trade union fees, 
with some large individual donations also. The Liberal Democrats, in government until 2015, 
also gained some large gifts – as did UKIP.
Donating to parties is supposedly transparent. All gifts must be declared and sources 
made clear, and funding is regulated by the Electoral Commission. But unlike many liberal 
democracies, there are no maximum size limits on UK donations, although donations from 
overseas have been clamped down on. Critics argue that ‘the fact that political parties 
are sustained by just a handful of individuals makes unfair influence a very real possibility 
even if the reality is a system that is more corruptible than corrupt.’ Close analysis also 
shows a strong link between donations to political parties and membership of the House 
of Lords, now almost entirely in the gift of party leaders, despite supposedly stronger rules 
applying to ‘good conduct’ in public life (following scandals around 2009). In the past 
Conservative and Labour leaders have both been very reluctant to give up the lubricating 
role of the honours system in sustaining their funding hegemony and easing internal party 
management. The Tories (and Liberal Democrats in a lesser way) continue to take full 
advantage of this. However, Corbyn has made few Lords appointments, and the SNP will 
take no seats there. Meanwhile the Liberal Democrats have far and away the highest ratio 
of peerages and knighthoods amongst their past MPs of any UK political party.
Although party finance regulation is impartially implemented in a day-to-day manner, there 
is little to stop a government with a majority from legislating radically to change party 
finance rules in ‘sectarian’ ways that maximise their own individual party interests and 
directly damage opponents. In the UK’s ‘unfixed’ constitution, only elite self-restraint, Tory 
party misgivings or perhaps House of Lords changes (which made a difference to the anti-
union law in 2016) can prevent directly partisan manipulation of the opposition’s finances.
Conclusions
The conventional wisdom of ‘parties in decline’ does not now fit the recent history of the 
UK well, with some membership levels growing, and others fairly stable. Some ‘new party’ 
trends emerged (for a while) within Labour and the SNP, utilising different, more digital ways 
of mobilising and stronger links to parts of civil society. Internal party elections of most key 
candidates (not leaders) are generally stronger now than in earlier decades (except within 
UKIP). So parties are not yet just the self-serving ‘cartels’ that critics often allege.
Yet many problems remain. The Brexit divide cuts across party lines in an acute way, 
producing deliberate vagueness in what each of the two top parties say to voters on this 
crucial issue. The provisions for party members to elect leaders were left unused in the 
Conservative Party in 2016, and for a time created almost insupportable strains within 
Labour under Corbyn. The problem of a ‘club ethos’ uniting MPs in the main parties was 
evident in the over-protection that the Westminster election system grants Conservatives, 
Labour and now the SNP; in the very partial regulation of political financing and the (only 
weakly regulated) effective ‘sale’ of honours; in the ability of governments to legislate in 
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sectarian ways to weaken their opposition parties; in weak internal democracy controls 
or influence over parties’ policy stances and manifestos; and in the sheer scale of 
parliamentary party remoteness from membership views that can arise.
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